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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
No. 10-4065 
_____________ 
 
SHUN XIAN DING, 
 
                   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A098 277 222) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret Reichenberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 18, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  May 18, 2011 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Shun Xian Ding petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) that denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  We will 
deny the petition for review. 
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Ding is a native and citizen of China.  He originally applied for asylum based on 
his opposition to China‟s family planning policy.  He was found not to be credible, and 
his asylum claim was denied.  He then filed a timely motion to reopen, claiming that he 
had begun attending a Christian church in the United States in October of 2008, that he 
had been baptized on December 21, 2008, and that China had recently increased 
suppression of non-sanctioned religious groups in China.  A.R. 25.   
 The BIA noted that most of the documentary evidence Ding submitted with his 
motion to reopen was not new—much predated his February 17, 2009 hearing before an 
Immigration Judge.  The BIA found that a 2009 congressional report Ding submitted did 
not reflect “new” information, as it referenced “continued” control and suppression of 
religious activity in China.  The BIA also noted that Ding and his family were already 
Christians when Ding was living in China, and found that Ding‟s decision to attend 
church and be baptized in the United States did not change his “self-report.”  Ding 
reported that a relative experienced trouble in 2004 due to religious activity, but the BIA 
found he could have raised that claim in his earlier proceedings.  Ding‟s wife submitted a 
letter, but the BIA found it “vague.”  The BIA stated, “[s]he asserts that she „recently‟ 
stopped attending „the local church‟ because of „interference and dismantlement,‟ also 
alleging that „[m]any of our church members were arrested.‟”  The BIA noted that the 
letter did not give any details as to time, place, or actors involved. Ding also cited an 
incident in July 2009 in Shanxi Province, but the BIA noted that Ding is not from that 
province.  Ding also referred to a June 2009 incident at a private church in his hometown 
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that was raided by police during a meeting of preachers.  The BIA did not directly 
discount this incident, but did state that “there is no evidence reflecting that any of the 
particularized incidents alleged by the respondent in support of his motion ever 
occurred,” so that the BIA was “unable to determine whether they are new and material 
for purposes of reopening.”  
“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a 
hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other 
evidentiary material. . . .  A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it 
appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available 
and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(1).  The BIA may deny a motion to reopen where “the movant has not 
introduced previously unavailable, material evidence.”  INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 
(1988).   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the BIA‟s denial 
of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  See Fadiga v. Att‟y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 
153 (3d Cir. 2007).  Under that standard, we will not reverse the BIA‟s decision unless “it 
is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2002)).   
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen where it 
concluded that much of the evidence Ding presented was not “new”; i.e., it could have 
been produced at Ding‟s earlier hearing.  What little evidence Ding presented that post-
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dated his hearing did not establish a change in circumstances from the time of his 
hearing, as opposed to a continuation of suppression of underground churches.  Further, 
aside from a vague reference in his wife‟s letter regarding “interference” and 
“dismantlement” of a local church, and an unsupported statement in his motion that in 
June 2009 preachers in an unregistered church in his hometown “were suppressed by the 
local government and the trainers were expelled,” A.R. 25, none of the evidence Ding 
submitted referred to increased religious persecution in his home province.  
 Ding argues in his brief here that he should not have been required to make an 
asylum claim on the basis of religious persecution “at an earlier time” because the claim 
“would not have been credible or reasonable,” as he was not a devout believer growing 
up.  Petitioner‟s Brief at 7.  However, Ding had been baptized nearly two months before 
his individual hearing.  Ding did not move to continue his hearing to add a claim on the 
basis of religious persecution or otherwise raise the claim in his hearing.  We thus hold 
that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ding failed to present previously 
unavailable and material evidence in support of his motion to reopen. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
